USS Cod (SS-224) — Seven War Patrols, 1943–1945
USS Cod's maiden war patrol, under Commander J.C. Dempsey, was a 63-day voyage into the South China Sea that established the crew's combat readiness through careful patrolling and their first successful attack.
On November 8, 1943, at 0405, Cod heard a series of 12 explosions ahead while patrolling near Macclesfield Bank. When they closed to investigate, they found a burning tanker already torpedoed by another submarine, blazing so intensely that details were indiscernible. A Chidori-class escort was circling, echo-ranging. The tanker exploded violently at 0653 and sank—Cod had witnessed another sub's handiwork.
Cod's first true attack came on November 29 at dawn in the Palawan Passage. In poor visibility with rain squalls, the crew sighted a convoy of 4 ships (1 tanker, 2 freighters, 1 transport) escorted by a Minekaze-class destroyer.
At 0621, Commander Dempsey fired 6 torpedoes at the AK (cargo ship) and AP (transport):
The escort dropped depth charges (none closer than 400 yards). Sound reported the distinct crackling and groaning of a ship breaking up. The AK was later assessed as sunk.
The patrol was cut short due to deteriorating main engine exhaust valves. Cod returned to Fremantle on December 16, 1943, having established herself as a combat-ready boat with a confirmed sinking.
Departing Fremantle on January 11, 1944, Cod's second patrol was marked by frustration, illness, and a maddeningly elusive convoy that the crew chased for days without firing a shot.
Upon surfacing, half the crew was already nauseated and many started vomiting. Within an hour, practically the entire crew exhibited symptoms: cramps, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, weak pulse, and subnormal temperature. About half recovered during the night's surface operations; the rest took two more days. Some cases lasted as long as five days. The debilitated crew would soon face a convoy they couldn't catch.
On January 29, Cod sighted a northbound convoy—1 tanker, 2 freighters, and 2-3 escorts—close to the Indo-China coast. The crew began a grueling all-night surface chase, attempting to get ahead for a night attack.
Despite multiple approach attempts, everything went wrong: visual bearings didn't match the TDC setup, enemy zigs placed them too close or too far from track, and the nearly-incapacitated crew struggled to perform.
Commander Dempsey wrote in his report that the officers and crew "performed their duties to the best of their abilities" but accepted "full responsibility for this fiasco." The convoy escaped toward Tourane Bay at dawn, never to be seen again.
In a rare surface engagement, Cod encountered a power-driven sampan with the Rising Sun painted on its deck house, 160 miles from land. When the sampan either opened fire with small arms or began signaling, Cod's gun crews set it ablaze and blew it apart with 4-inch and 20mm fire.
After weeks of frustration, Cod finally scored on February 23 northeast of Morotai Island. At 0524, lookouts sighted smoke and a mast—a large Zuiyo Maru-type tanker (~7,360 tons) escorted by a smaller maru and a subchaser echo-ranging on 17 KCS. Cod tracked submerged through daylight, surfaced at 1120, and chased until nightfall.
At 2218, Cod closed to 2,300 yards and fired a spread of four torpedoes at the tanker:
Four days later, off South Loloda Island near Halmahera, Cod made radar contact at 12,000 yards on a large freighter hugging the coast with a small escort trailing 700-1,000 yards astern. The target appeared to be an MFM-type freighter of about 5,000-6,000 tons.
At 0257, Cod closed to attack. But at 0258, with range 3,200 yards, the target began signaling to its escort—and both ships opened fire on the submarine. No splashes were seen, but Cod was now attacking under enemy gunfire.
Undeterred, at 0259 Commander Dempsey fired a spread of four torpedoes at 2,900 yards:
The radar pip vanished at 4,500 yards. The escort fired guns and dropped depth charges for 20 minutes after the attack, but Cod slipped away.
Two days later, near Buton Strait, Cod detected echo-ranging at an estimated 24,000 yards—an hour before actually sighting the target. It proved to be a Yamazato Maru-type cargo ship escorted by a Terutsuki-class destroyer, one of Japan's most capable anti-submarine vessels.
As Cod maneuvered for a stern tube shot, the crew observed an unusual sight: at least 100 Japanese sailors lining the destroyer's rails, apparently serving as periscope lookouts. The Japanese were learning.
At 1449, Cod fired three torpedoes—but the gyro regulator had tripped out a minute before firing, forcing the crew to match gyros by hand. A fourth torpedo couldn't fire at all; its gyro spindle was frozen. Post-attack analysis revealed the gyro angles lagged 5-7 degrees behind the TDC settings, causing all torpedoes to miss astern. The Terutsuki dropped depth charges—close ones—but Cod escaped to fight another day.
Cod returned to Fremantle on March 13, 1944. With two confirmed sinkings despite the frustrations, Patrol 2 was deemed successful.
Departing Fremantle on April 6, 1944, Cod's third patrol took her through the Celebes Sea and into the Sulu Sea, operating off the Zamboanga Peninsula and the dangerous shallows near Basilan Strait.
The patrol began with valuable mutual training exercises in company with USS Jack along the approach to Darwin. The submarines practiced surface and submerged approaches against each other, giving lookouts numerous opportunities to observe periscopes at varying ranges—training that would prove invaluable.
Cod spent nearly a week patrolling the Makassar Strait, encountering heavy sailboat traffic but frustratingly little enemy shipping. On April 19, they tracked what appeared to be a target with echo-ranging and smoke, but the ship remained tantalizingly out of sight. During the pursuit, Cod ran into an extensive area of submerged wreckage including parts of a ship, huge logs, and debris—bending the pit-log swordarm and giving the torpedo shutters a severe banging.
On April 25, Cod made radar contact on a target making 15-16 knots—a medium-sized, high-speed vessel detected at an unusual 18,000 yards. Despite a night-long chase approaching Basilan Strait, the target made a landfall on Teinga Island and altered course to the southwest, escaping into waters too shallow for pursuit.
The patrol's defining moment came on May 10 off Luzon. At 0159, in bright moonlight, lookouts sighted smoke on the horizon. As Cod closed, radar revealed contact after contact—a massive convoy. Commander Dempsey wrote: "The area to the northeast looked like a forest." He counted masts and smoke from 33 ships, not including more visible only as distant smoke.
The convoy was organized into four formations, each with 2-3 columns. Kamikaze-class destroyers patrolled ahead and on the flanks; Chidori torpedo boats and minesweepers wove through the interior. Two Mavis flying boats provided air cover.
Swinging immediately to the bow tubes, Dempsey fired six more torpedoes at the cargo ships in 84 seconds—two at a Kasado Maru-type transport, four at a large Asosan Maru-type freighter. The overlapping targets meant even misses might find a hull. Sound tracked the torpedoes running true: one hit on the Kasado Maru, three hits on the Asosan Maru, and one more on a Brisbane Maru-type in the far column after a run of 3,800 yards.
Nine torpedoes fired in under two minutes. Seven hits. Breaking-up noises filled the sound gear. For the next two hours, the crew heard the distinctive "firecracker explosions" of ammunition cargo detonating.
The patrol report credited Cod with sinking one destroyer (1,315 tons) and probably sinking three cargo ships totaling over 20,000 tons.
On the return voyage, Cod experienced an unsettling night transit of Sibutu Passage. Between 0100 and 0400 on May 23—with the moon nearly full—and reports that the passage was "heavily patrolled," the crew picked up approximately 30 radar contacts on small objects at ranges from 2,000 down to 800 yards. Some passed as close as 400-500 yards. Yet even in the bright moonlight, none could be sighted. The radar pips resembled those from oil drums or fishstakes, but their true nature remained a mystery as Cod crept southward 3-4 miles off Sibutu Island's east coast.
The patrol concluded with transits through Makassar Strait and Lombok Strait. Cod returned to Fremantle on June 1, 1944. The May 10 attack made this one of Cod's most successful patrols—one destroyer confirmed sunk and three large cargo ships probably sunk, totaling over 21,000 tons.
Cod's fourth patrol, now under Commander J.A. Adkins, was plagued by torpedo failures that proved maddeningly persistent. With each failed attack, the report noted, "the Commanding Officer had become more and more anxious to destroy these... targets." Despite multiple well-executed attacks, the torpedoes consistently ran deep or failed to detonate.
Before heading into the patrol area, Cod topped off her fuel tanks at the Muiron Islands, a staging anchorage off Western Australia near Exmouth Gulf. On July 6, she came alongside USS Sandlance and received 12,000 gallons of diesel oil—submarines supporting each other in the field. Sandlance then proceeded to the fuel barge in Exmouth Gulf to replenish what she'd shared.
This patrol marked Cod's first coordinated operations with other submarines. She operated in conjunction with USS Cabrilla and later USS Bluefish, exchanging information and coordinating search patterns via SJ radar and hand-keying signals.
On July 16, Cod attacked three MFM-type steamers of about 2,000 tons each in the Sulu Sea near Busuanga. Despite a textbook approach:
After surfacing, the crew performed something remarkable: they replayed the attack on the TDC. The Mark IV Torpedo Data Computer could rerun a firing problem using the recorded inputs, allowing post-attack analysis. The replay revealed two issues: "firing was commenced too soon" and "ship's head was swinging during firing"—the boat was still turning when the torpedoes left the tubes. But critically, the TDC rerun showed that at least one torpedo should have hit. The geometry was correct; the torpedoes simply ran too deep.
This kind of rigorous analysis—using the TDC's replay capability to distinguish between crew error and torpedo failure—was standard practice. In this case, it confirmed what the CO suspected: the MK 23 torpedoes were running deeper than set. The escort chased and fired at Cod, with shells splashing close aboard before they escaped.
On July 19, heavy swells and whitecaps from the southwest made depth control difficult. At periscope depth near Cabra Island, Cod had to "use negative" twice—rapidly flooding the negative buoyancy tank to pull the boat down when waves pushed her toward the surface. These were challenging conditions for a submerged approach.
The weather worsened. On July 20, Cod contacted another convoy at 21,000 yards and tracked it by radar alone—visibility was less than 1,000 yards due to heavy rain and dark, overhanging clouds. The target, a 4,000-5,000 ton AK, was visible only in brief lightning flashes. At 0444, Cod fired four stern tubes at 1,350 yards. The TDC solution was good; post-attack analysis confirmed the firing data was correct.
After the frustrating series of attacks with no confirmed hits, Cod put into Darwin on July 29 for torpedo reloads and repairs. She departed the following day, heading for the Celebes Sea—where her luck would finally change.
Cod continued her successful streak in the Celebes area:
On August 19, Cod entered Ombai Passage for the homeward transit, paralleling the coast of Alor at 6-7 miles. That night, the crew observed brush fires on Timor—and on the southern tip of Pantar Island, a "large fire or volcano" glowing in the darkness. The report noted an "active volcano presumed be DLAKI DLANA on PANTAR ISLAND... observed from 35 miles distant." In reality, there is no volcano at Pantar's southern tip; the crew was likely seeing the incandescence of Pura, a small but active volcanic island just south of Pantar, its glow visible across the dark tropical waters.
Cod returned to Fremantle on August 25, 1944. Despite the early torpedo frustrations, the patrol ended successfully with multiple confirmed sinkings in the Celebes Sea region.
Departing Fremantle on September 18, 1944, Cod's fifth patrol was her most productive, featuring multiple attacks, coordinated wolf pack operations with USS Ray, and the sinking of significant enemy tonnage. This patrol would also mark her transfer from the Australia-based submarine force to the Pacific Fleet.
En route to her patrol area, Cod entered Darwin harbor on September 25 and moored alongside USS Coucal, a submarine tender. The crew commenced loading torpedoes, fueling, and making voyage repairs. Cod's CO met with the commanding officer of USS Angler to exchange tactical intelligence, and obtained information on allied merchant shipping from a Royal Australian Intelligence officer at Darwin. Most significantly, Cod received new orders by despatch: she was to conduct coordinated search and attack operations with USS Ray in areas west of southern Luzon and Palawan— the beginning of her wolf pack assignment.
The departure on September 26 did not go smoothly. Shortly after getting underway, the bow planes failed to rig in during testing, followed by a fire in the rigging panel. The crew cleared electrical circuits but could not reduce the heavy overload. At 1244, Cod reversed course for Darwin. Coucal, having decoded Cod's message, got underway immediately to escort her back into harbor. Repairs were completed, and Cod finally departed on September 27.
Operating under these new orders, Cod worked as part of a two-boat wolf pack with USS Ray, coordinating via SJ radar communications and voice radio. The boats exchanged tactical information and divided patrol areas to maximize coverage of the approaches to Manila.
On October 1, Cod joined USS Angler in searching for 9 crew members from a downed B-24 bomber in the Makassar Strait. They questioned native schooners and conducted a parallelogram search pattern. Despite extensive efforts, the aviators were never found.
The signature attack began when Cod sighted a 5-ship convoy off Mindoro protected by a Wakatake-class destroyer. In terrible visibility with rain squalls:
After the tanker attack, Cod formed a scouting line with USS Ray. They tracked a large 15,000-ton oiler with escorts. Cod's stern tube attack scored 2 hits, and Ray finished the damaged oiler the following morning.
Cod encountered a 1,500-ton warship with unusual "ski-slide" stern configuration. After maneuvering for position, Cod fired 6 bow tubes—but the target spotted the torpedo wakes and turned to avoid. The escort dropped 5 depth charges and departed.
The following morning brought the patrol's only heavy weather. During a radar approach on two small escort vessels, Cod attempted to force through heavy seas on the surface. The result: "a large amount of water down the conning tower hatch." No material damage, but a reminder that the sea itself could be as dangerous as the enemy.
Cod was assigned lifeguard duty west of Subic Bay during carrier strikes on Luzon. These raids were part of the opening phase of the U.S. reconquest of the Philippines, conducted by U.S. Navy Task Force 38 under Admiral William F. Halsey—just two days before the amphibious landings at Leyte on October 20, 1944.
On October 18, with her BK beacon lit, searchlight rigged, flares mounted, and colors flying, Cod watched flights of 30 aircraft—SB2Cs and F6Fs—approach from the south, heading northeast for Subic. Two fighters peeled off to investigate Cod; she turned to show her silhouette, and they passed six miles away.
Commander Adkins was so moved by the sight that he quoted Tennyson's "Locksley Hall" in his patrol report—an 1835 poem that prophetically imagined aerial warfare:
"Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain'd a ghostly dew
From the nations' airy navies grappling in the central blue..."
He added wryly: "It all seemed to fit, except the final line. If we want to reserve MANILA and SUBIC BAYS for our own use in the next war, we had better keep plenty of airy navy stationed there."
Off Cape Bolinao, Cod sighted five "sea trucks"—motor-driven boats with foresails—heading south. The OOD talked the CO into a battle surface to engage with the 4-inch deck gun. What followed was, in Commander Adkins' words, a "fiasco."
The third shot scored a hit—but had no effect. Then the foot-firing mechanism jammed. While the crew cleared the jam, all five sea trucks turned toward Cod and opened fire with .30 to .50 caliber guns. Their shots fell 1,000 yards short, but "the ricochets were singing all around us."
Cod turned away, cleared the jam, and resumed firing—75 rounds total. The deflection control was "beautiful," but the pointing was "exasperating": shots fell 100 yards over, then 50 short, then 50 over, with "monotonous regularity." One more hit was scored, again with no effect. Approaching the 100-fathom curve near shore, Cod broke off.
When another sea truck was spotted, the CO called the gun crew back to stations "to let them save their face"—but an aircraft contact forced them to clear the deck and submerge, losing the breech cover in the process. Adkins reflected that more would have been sunk had he "dashed in to close range with 20 mms, machine guns, and 4-inch all blazing."
On the evening of October 24, Cod made radar contact with a major convoy: the transport ASAMA MARU—a 16,975-ton ocean liner converted to troop transport—accompanied by three large cargo ships and five escorts. This was exactly the kind of high-value target submarines hunted. Cod had just four torpedoes remaining, all in her stern tubes.
The targets tracked at 15 knots, zigging every five minutes. As Cod worked up ahead, ASAMA MARU began making 60-degree zigs, pulling away from the other ships. Commander Adkins picked the transport as his target and closed for a stern shot. At 0402 on October 25, Cod fired her last four torpedoes at 4,300 yards range.
All four missed. No splashes, no explosions—nothing. The fire control had checked perfectly; no fault could be found. The CO's anguish was palpable:
"No one could feel more deeply about missing this target than myself and crew. The thought of the American and Australian soldiers that may be killed by the enemy troops and equipment in this transport is very sobering, indeed."
In his later analysis, he reflected:
"The saddest feature of the whole attack, to me, is that under similar circumstances I would not know how to conduct it differently. With a high speed target, on a clear night, zigging widely on short legs, and torpedoes aft only, I know of no better means of approach than to get up ahead, wait for a favorable zig and take the best shot that presents itself, within the maximum range of the torpedo."
Now truly out of torpedoes, Cod could have broken off. Instead, at 0436, Commander Adkins made a fateful decision:
"After missing this cold set-up, I determined then and there that we would track this convoy until we should turn it over to another submarine."
For the next 30 hours, Cod shadowed the convoy, sending contact reports with position, course, and speed to anyone who could attack. The reports went out to "all hands from Admiral HALSEY down"—including the China Air Force, in case the convoy was headed for Indo-China. On the area frequency, she broadcast with the added information that she was "trailing, with no torpedoes."
Multiple submarines received Cod's broadcasts. USS Cero, patrolling nearby, intercepted the contact reports and headed north to intercept. But Cero was on a Special Mission—a covert supply run, delivering 17 tons of supplies and 16 U.S. Army personnel to Philippine guerrillas along the coast of Luzon. Her orders explicitly "prohibited attacking an escorted merchant convoy": an attack could draw Japanese forces to the area and compromise the rendezvous. Cero could only engage "important warships"—everything else had to be avoided.
Cero tried to tell Cod she would go around astern to trail and report, but couldn't raise her: "Unable to raise COD by radio or SJ."
The convoy escaped. At 2229, it rounded Cape Fief off San Fernando, slowed, and entered Lingayen Gulf. Cod patrolled north of Cape Bolinao, waiting for them to come out—but they never did. Cero later concluded: "Apparently the convoy reported by COD anchored overnight in one of the several refuges along the west coast of Luzon." Cero couldn't pass this intelligence to Cod—transmitting via shore station "would subject us to DF'ing" (direction-finding by the enemy).
The next evening, October 27, Cod picked up another target: a lone, unescorted merchantman—a large cargo ship of about 7,500 tons—heading south along the coast. Still out of torpedoes, Cod again became a tracker. She called USS Bream on voice radio, reporting: "trailing lone merchantman, course 145." Bream replied: "save this plum for us."
For the next several hours, Cod shadowed the target, broadcasting contact reports with position, course, speeds, zig plan, base course—everything Bream needed to close in. Bream's patrol report later praised Cod's coordination: "COD kept up running commentary on target's course and speed. His work in trailing could not have been better, and we much appreciated this opportunity."
The attack, however, did not go as planned. As Bream closed to 11,500 yards, the target spotted her—silhouetted by the near-full moon—and opened fire with gunfire. The merchantman turned and ran, zigging violently. Despite the chase, Bream eventually broke off at 0443.
Bream's CO was crushed: "This is certainly a heart breaker. COD will be plenty burned up and rightly Target was large AK." On surfacing, they discovered the real culprit—the radar shafting had been knocked out of alignment, causing discrepancies between sound and radar bearings that hampered the approach.
The moonlight explanation came two days later. After departing the prisoner rendezvous with Cod, Bream's CO noticed they could see Cod "out to range over 10,000 yards in moonlight—After Radar had lost pip." His conclusion: "Guess the target saw us last night." The "plum" escaped not through supernatural luck, but because submarines were visible at tremendous range in bright moonlight—and the merchantman had been watching.
On October 29, Bream rendezvoused with Cod to transfer prisoners. Bream's log records the exchange of recognition signals at 0323, then at 0440: "Transferred six prisoners to COD. Wished all hands luck on way home. Felt tough all over again about missing out on last nights target. COD was not too crazy about the Japs."
The prisoners were Japanese soldiers whose transport had been sunk from under them. Their condition was grim: the men were "covered with open ulcerated sores similar to the sores of syphilis, and chancres." The pharmacist's mate treated them with sulfa powder and ointment dressings.
The prisoners were kept strictly isolated from the crew. The magazine was converted to a brig, and after the prisoners departed at Saipan, the space was scrubbed with soap and water, then wiped down with torpedo alcohol—the Navy's all-purpose disinfectant.
Cod stopped briefly at Saipan on November 6—where she experienced two night air raids by Japanese aircraft—before continuing east. She arrived at Pearl Harbor on November 20, 1944, completing her transfer from the Southwest Pacific submarine force to the Pacific Fleet.
Cod departed Pearl Harbor on March 24, 1945 and arrived at Guam on April 9. There she received orders under ComSubPac Operation Order No. 75-45 to conduct coordinated patrol and lifeguard operations for the 5th Air Force with USS Pompon in the East China Sea. Getting underway that same day, Commander J.A. Adkins led Cod on this harrowing 51-day mission into the heavily mined and defended waters of the East China Sea and Formosa Strait. The patrol featured close-quarters gun battles, torpedo attacks, and narrow escapes.
April 14 proved to be one of the patrol's most harrowing days. That morning, a lookout sighted a large 4-engine float plane dead ahead at an estimated range of 5 miles. Cod submerged immediately. Seven minutes later, one bomb detonated close enough to jar loose an electrical connection in the after torpedo room.
Later that day, a lookout spotted a floating mine—round, with four horns visible, floating two-thirds submerged and appearing fairly new. Cod took photographs, then attempted to destroy it. .30 caliber carbine shots bounced off the mine's case; it took .50 caliber fire to detonate it at 125 yards. Several pieces of spent shrapnel hit the boat.
Less than an hour later, Cod struck a submerged object—the impact heard throughout the boat, loudest in the forward torpedo room. The pit log was knocked out of commission and the rod meter bent so badly the crew couldn't retrieve it with a chain fall. They jettisoned it and installed a spare. In these heavily mined waters, the submerged object may well have been a dud mine whose contact horns failed to detonate—an extraordinarily lucky escape.
On the night of April 16, a lookout and the OOD spotted a mine close aboard to starboard, plainly visible in the moonstreak. Commander Adkins stopped and began maneuvering to destroy it—a maneuver he noted was "not as foolhardy as it sounds." By steering 170° to the left of the moon's azimuth, he knew the mine was on his port hand and could always pull clear to the right.
His plan: silhouette the mine in the moonlight and sink it with gunfire. The SJ radar picked up the mine at 1,000 yards. But just as he maneuvered it into the moonstreak, the moon became obscured by low clouds on the horizon. Cod resumed course and speed, maneuvering to avoid floating objects in the darkness.
On April 17, Cod used her 5-inch gun to attack a floating mine—the first two rounds were short, and the third was a dud that ricocheted off the water. They finished it with a direct 40mm hit.
Later that morning, lookouts spotted two ships in the haze. Tracking revealed one was towing the other. Cod maneuvered to keep the armed tug masked by the tow, then surfaced 3,750 yards astern and opened fire. At 3,200 yards, 5-inch rounds struck the tow—an oiler carrying oil cargo. "Great clouds of black smoke poured out and flames roared forth as if from jets." Cod shifted fire to the tug, hitting it as well.
Aircraft forced Cod to break off and submerge, but both vessels were destroyed: the tug CHOYO MARU (~2,000 tons) and the oiler BAISHI MARU (~2,000 tons). Cod recovered survivors, gaining valuable intelligence about Japanese shipping routes between Keelung and Shimonoseki.
On April 19, a lookout sighted a ship and Cod set battle stations, closing to investigate. It turned out to be a fishing sampan. After firing a 40mm round across her bow, Cod maneuvered alongside. It was a typical Chinese fishing boat—"eyes painted in the bow, oldest man at the tiller, youngest and smallest at the sculling oar, one small boy hiding under the deck boards, lots of yammering."
The Chief of the Boat boarded and found the sum of their cargo: one sack of beans, a half-bushel of potatoes, and one fish. Cod gave the occupants five packages of cigarettes, with which they were highly pleased. Pictures were taken.
The patrol's major action came on the night of April 24-25 in the Formosa Strait.
At 2130, the TDM picked up pinging. Cod closed to investigate and radar found two ships at 9,450 yards—both pinging at 15.6 kcs. Cod attacked on the surface, firing 4 torpedoes. All ran erratically and missed.
The target opened fire with its main battery. Shells splashed close—the nearest falling 40 yards from the bow and 20 yards to starboard of the after engine room hatch, splashing water on the bridge. Commander Adkins estimated the guns were 4.7-inch caliber from the "deafening detonation." The target then switched to machine guns and tracers. The next day, the crew dug a lead slug out of the superstructure—they had been hit.
Cod submerged and was depth charged, which knocked out the ST radar tuning.
At 0031, Cod came to periscope depth. The anti-submarine vessel lay 4,000 yards away, apparently stopped. The crew made ready 3 torpedoes forward and 3 aft. As Ensign Wallace and RT1c Thomas worked to repair the ST, the target began sweeping toward them, zigging 60° from side to side.
With the range down to 3,500 yards and the ST back in commission, Cod fired. One torpedo hit Minesweeper No. 41, which sank. Passing through the oil slick, the crew counted "78 heads... on one side only. There were more than this swimming. Most of them were shouting and moaning in a melancholy manner."
Cod picked up one survivor—ALYEEMA, a 1st class petty officer from the engineering branch. He was badly injured internally and confirmed the ship's identity.
Cod pursued the remaining two escorts, attacking on the surface with 6 torpedoes—3 at each target. All ran erratically. No hits.
Of 16 torpedoes fired during this patrol, 12 ran erratically. Post-attack analysis and prisoner interrogation confirmed that many torpedoes were visibly broaching, porpoising, or running in circles—a frustrating continuation of the torpedo problems that plagued earlier patrols.
With the warhead at risk of detonation, the Executive Officer requested permission to open the after torpedo room hatch. FOLEY, L.E., QM2c, volunteered to go on deck to help open the hatch. JOHNSON, A.G., S1c, coming up to stand lookout, was sent aft to assist. A wave washed both men overboard. Johnson had no life jacket.
Meanwhile, Lt. K.F. Beckman and torpedomen Krusenklaus and Grenner performed heroic acts—working in intense heat and smoke, rigging jiggers to the red-hot torpedo, and holding their thumbs over the hydrogen burner hole during firing—to eject the burning torpedo from the tube before the warhead could explode.
Cod searched through the night. A PBM seaplane from Okinawa arrived to help, dropping flares and a life raft. The next morning, fighters and another PBM joined the search despite terrible weather. The fighters offered to stay beyond their fuel limit; the CO later wrote: "We felt that we were being backed up by a pretty fine organization when these fliers came out in this stinking weather to help us."
At 0520 on April 27, FOLEY was recovered—utterly exhausted but alive. He reported that he had supported JOHNSON in the water for hours, but about two hours before rescue, Johnson "said good-bye" and slipped under. Andrew G. Johnson, S1c, was never found. On April 29, Cod conducted burial services for him.
On April 28, the Japanese prisoner ALYEEMA died of acute peritonitis—likely caused by internal injuries from a depth charge that had not been set to safe before his ship sank. Cod held a funeral service for him, and he was buried at sea.
On the morning of May 2, a periscope sighting initially thought to be a sampan rapidly developed into a properly marked hospital ship on a northerly course at 14 knots—similar in appearance to TATUHARU MARU. Cod pulled off the ship's track into the sun and watched her go by.
That night, Cod tracked two radar contacts in darkness, rain, and overcast. After closing to 1,500 yards, they made out the sails of two junks—the same ones spotted earlier. No threat.
Later that night, Cod raised a PBM flying boat from Okinawa on VHF. The plane had also detected Cod's wolfpack partner Pompon on radar. When Cod reported the suspicious junks to the south, the PBM flew off and illuminated them with flares, returning to report they appeared friendly. The pilot offered to remain in the area most of the night and to call on him if needed—a striking example of air-submarine coordination, made possible by the capture of Okinawa just weeks earlier.
On May 6, Cod had to run through a Chinese fishing fleet to retire their scouting line. The crew decided to investigate—and see if they could pick up some fish.
Firing 40mm warning shots across bows, they stopped several junks and sampans. Finding nothing suspicious, they began trading: bread, canned goods, and cigarettes for fresh fish. One batch turned out to be salt water eels—"Very good." Another batch had been drying in the sun too long: "we had to throw them over the side."
That evening, Cod formed a scouting line with Pompon and resumed patrol.
On May 8, while on periscope patrol off Haitan Island, Cod observed numerous fishing sampans. Two of them spotted the periscope as they passed close aboard. One fisherman, apparently thinking it was flotsam worth retrieving, decided to grab it—making two passes at the scope, once with a boat hook and once with a man leaning out of the bow.
Commander Adkins noted dryly: "Our pink periscope camouflage is apparently better than I had thought." (U.S. submarines used pink paint on periscopes—related to "Mountbatten Pink"—believing it helped them blend with the water and sky at dawn and dusk.)
On May 9, Cod surfaced to find a fishing net and line draped over the boat—likely snagged while submerging through the fishing fleet. The crew bundled it up, found the nearest sampan, and returned it.
The fisherman was overjoyed. Adkins noted: "This was also the best gift we had made to any Chinaman yet." When Cod shoved off, the grateful fishermen chased them for several minutes, attempting to give them fish in return.
On May 16, the SJ radar picked up interference that the radar officer was certain indicated a Japanese 10-centimeter radar. With fuel to spare, Adkins decided to chase this "will-o'-the-wisp." After hours of maneuvering—including steaming in a square in the middle of Formosa Strait—he concluded that the interference did not necessarily indicate an enemy radar at all.
On May 17, Cod approached a junk—and four Chinese immediately jumped aboard the submarine. When the crew directed the rest to man their sampan and come alongside, they thought they were all being invited aboard and paddled over eagerly.
The crew had to use "threats with guns and main force" to prevent more from boarding. Getting all 14 Chinese back into the sampan with their bags and baggage was "a feat of no mean suasion on the part of the Chief of the Boat." Those on deck "went to their knees and protested while those who were in the sampan joined them in moaning and sighing." The sampan was taking water over the gunwales, though Adkins noted it "was in no danger of sinking."
With a guard keeping the sampan's occupants in place with a carbine, the boarding party searched the junk: a small amount of fish, 3 bags of rice, some papers, and a suitcase of civilian clothes—nothing suspicious. Cod decided not to sink her. Before casting loose, they gave the fishermen a gunny sack of canned food and a whole carton of cigarettes—which, Adkins noted, "should more than make up for the holes in their sails and the damage to their halyards."
On May 18, Cod set course north along the China coast to search by daylight an area that had "now become blind bombing by night"—a testament to the intensity of ongoing 5th Air Force raids on Formosa.
When Cod approached junk #11704, the fishermen doused their sails in alarm. "All hands showed considerable alarm until we broke out the colors, at which the occupants smiled and waved at us."
That morning, orders arrived from ComSubPac: Cod was to rendezvous with USS Muskallunge to transfer the PCO (Prospective Commanding Officer) from Cod to assume command of Muskallunge, and to receive the sick CO of Muskallunge for evacuation to Guam.
On the night of May 20-21, in fairly heavy seas, Cod rendezvoused with Muskallunge. To calm the water, Muskallunge pumped oil while Cod circled, spreading additional oil—including 5 gallons from the "Forward Torpedo Room head."
At 0040, Comdr. W.H. Lawrence climbed into a rubber boat with Lt. Hurst as coxswain and set off across the oil slick to assume command of Muskallunge. The oil slick "proved reasonably effective in keeping the waves from breaking." Lt. Hurst's chief difficulty, however, was unexpected: "the fish nudging him through the bottom of the boat." He turned off his light when this happened—but turned it back on when Cod started playing the searchlight.
Muskallunge received Lawrence, then sent the rubber boat back with Lt. Comdr. L.A. Lajaunie Jr., her sick former commanding officer. Cod recovered the boat at 0150. Five minutes later, Muskallunge departed on patrol and Cod set course for Guam.
As Cod headed for Guam, the barometer began falling—dropping 0.30 inches in one hour. They were in the northeast quadrant of a cyclonic storm. At 1600, the barometer steadied at 29.60 inches, winds decreased, and for a brief period they experienced "an almost calm sea with a slight up and down movement and the sun shining overhead"—they had passed through the eye of the typhoon. By 1700, wind and sea picked up again from the southwest as they cleared the storm center.
That night, during transit of the Nansei Shoto, Cod contacted an Okinawa-based search plane. After the pilot reported no targets, Cod warned him about the typhoon to the northwest. He replied that he already knew—"he had been flying around in it for the past 3 hours."
Cod returned to Guam on May 29, 1945, having sunk Minesweeper No. 41, destroyed 11 floating mines by gunfire, survived intense close-range combat, and suffered the tragic loss of Seaman Johnson—the only crew member killed during Cod's seven war patrols.
Departing Guam on June 26, 1945, USS Cod's seventh and final war patrol, under new commanding officer Lt. Comdr. E.M. Westbrook Jr., was a dramatic 49-day mission that culminated in the war's end. It featured one of the most remarkable rescue operations in submarine history, combat action, and a harrowing escape that left sailors stranded behind enemy lines.
On July 1, after transiting the Batan Island Group, Cod reported for duty to CTF 71 (Commander Task Force 71) and received her assignment: patrol area off the southeast Indo-China coast.
On July 5, Cod rendezvoused with USS Besugo off Badai Bay. Besugo shared what intel she had: "she had been here three weeks and that the area was dead." The CO noted dryly: "Encouraging news!" Cod "bid her farewell and took up our lonely vigil."
On July 7, Cod received orders from CTF 71 to proceed to Subic Bay to refuel—a brief interruption before the patrol's most dramatic event.
On July 8, en route to Subic Bay, Cod received orders to divert to Ladd Reef at four-engine speed. Until contact was made, they didn't know the condition of O-19 or her crew. Cod prepared for the worst: rubber boats, heaving lines, life rings, and rescue party topside; "dry clothes, empty bunks, hot soup and coffee below."
O-19's captain, Lt. Comdr. J.F.D. van Hooff, RNN, hadn't lost his sense of humor. He requested Cod approach at dawn to take towlines. When Cod replied they would see him at dawn, van Hooff answered: "We will certainly be here."
On July 9, the towing attempts began. The current was "really something"—1.5 knots easterly. Maneuvering was "ticklish cruising," trying to put Cod's bow within ten feet of O-19's stern without running aground themselves. With the cable secured, both submarines backed while O-19 fired her forward gun, "making lots of smoke"—using the recoil to add extra backward thrust. But the second cable snapped. Cod took aboard 80 fathoms of chain from O-19 and tried again.
On July 10, at 1145, the last line parted. After eight hours yesterday and six today with no progress, Adkins sent word to O-19: stand by to take off personnel. He wrote:
"Felt almost as bad as the O-19 skipper at his having to abandon his ship. However, did not see what more we could do."
Cod had touched bottom forward herself "at least once" during the many approaches—Adkins "did not desire to have two submarines aground." Their towing gear was "makeshift," and though the crew was "willing and resourceful," they were "inexperienced at rigging for a tow." And always, the specter: "Jap planes and/or subs might have appeared at any embarrassing moment."
All 56 Dutch officers and crew were evacuated to Cod. Then came the destruction:
What remained of O-19 stayed on the reef, listing and smoking heavily, but safe from Japanese capture. Adkins noted ruefully that he wished his first torpedo had been fired at an enemy rather than an ally. He "could appreciate the captain's feelings as he silently watched his boat being destroyed."
On July 13, Cod arrived at Subic Bay, escorted by USS Rombach (DE-364). Mooring alongside USS Anthedon, she transferred the 56 O-19 personnel ashore, received fuel, and effected minor voyage repairs before continuing her patrol.
On July 19, Cod received a contact report from USS Hammerhead on a convoy. Racing to intercept, she took up position in a scouting line with Hawkbill. By mid-morning, smoke was sighted—and with it, at least five aircraft providing air cover: float planes and land-based fighters circling protectively.
The convoy consisted of five ships: one oiler, three cargo vessels, a trawler escort, and a Kamikaze-class destroyer patrolling aggressively up and down the flank, presenting alternating 90° angles. At 1110, with the range down to 2,800 yards and a good firing solution, depth charges began falling before Cod could fire. The scope dipped under; the approach officer put in a sound bearing and fired three torpedoes at an AK. All missed—the target had been alerted and maneuvered to avoid.
Cod went deep to 150 feet in just 27 fathoms, rigging for depth charge. Over the next half hour, 18 depth charges fell—none too close. The patrol report later noted that a six-degree temperature gradient between 80 and 100 feet—a thermocline that would bend enemy sonar—"proved very useful in evasion tactics that day." When she came to periscope depth, the destroyer and trawler were milling around 8,000 yards astern.
That night, after unsuccessful attacks on the same convoy by USS Brill and USS Bumper, Cod made an end-around to get ahead of the target. At 0310 on July 20, she was in position—submerged, ready to fire bow tubes at the destroyer, then shift to stern tubes for the ships on his beam. Visibility was poor in heavy rain squalls.
Then, at 0313: "A wonderful thing has happened! Our radar just went out! Couldn't possibly have picked a more critical moment." An electrical fire in the SJ radar's main control unit had knocked it out completely. Without radar, the attack was hopeless.
"This was most discouraging, especially after having a second chance at this Jap. That KAMIKAZE must carry a good luck charm or pray to his gods regularly. Today he has dodged torpedoes fired by three submarines, requested and received a rain squall, and has cast a spell over our radar. He hasn't been touched!"
With conventional targets scarce, Cod turned to disrupting the small-boat traffic carrying contraband between Singapore and ports to the north. On July 21, after rendezvousing with Hammerhead, Cod sighted her first target—a large junk, 131 tons, carrying rice.
A single 40mm round fired ahead brought the junk to a halt. The crew of 12 "crawled over the stern fast" into their lifeboat. A boarding party inspected the cargo and papers—the ship had recently been in upkeep at Singapore. With the crew safely rowing toward shore four miles away, Cod opened fire: 7 rounds of 5-inch and 40 rounds of 40mm at 500 yards. The junk sank. It was the first of what would become 23 junks and motor sampans destroyed over the next twelve days.
The Japanese noticed. Within the hour, a float plane (Rufe) appeared and dropped two bombs as Cod dove. That evening, another aircraft made a run—swooping down with a zero angle on the bow. Two more bombs, "larger and/or closer than the other two earlier." The CO noted dryly: "Nips apparently know we are here."
Despite the attention, Cod rendezvoused with Hawkbill that night. The two submarines exchanged Loran charts, wolf pack information—and movies.
Cod dove as soon as topside was cleared—but one officer, four men, and their Chinese interpreter were still aboard the junk. Before the CO started down the hatch, "a burst of machine gun fire was heard by all hands in the conning tower (as well as by the COD and the C.O. on the bridge!)." As Cod passed fifty feet, they heard bullets from a second strafing run hitting the water above them. She leveled off at sixty feet—the charted depth—and headed east, trying for fifteen fathoms.
That evening at 1830, the Gunnery Officer dug a Japanese 20mm slug out of the superstructure. Inspection revealed evidence of 10 or 12 hits. Cod had been strafed, and the enemy had found his mark.
As darkness fell, Cod began searching for her lost men. At 2003 she closed the beach to investigate an anchored junk—but it wasn't theirs. At 2110 she began firing Very star flares every ten minutes, hoping the signalman striker aboard would see them and flash back with the flashlights the boarding party carried.
By August 2, Blenny was coordinating the search. The CO took a creative approach: finding an English-speaking native from a nearby junk, he sent the man ashore at a fishing village to ask for information—holding the junk "as insurance of his compliance." At 2130, 800 yards from beach, they put the man over in the junk's lifeboat, which promptly swamped.
That night, the CO's worry crept into the log: "Until dark tonight there seemed to be little doubt that we would at any moment find our missing shipmates. They were, individually, and as a group, experienced, capable and full of common sense." He noted they were well-armed—one Thompson, one carbine, four pistols, and each man had a sheath knife. A pre-arranged rendezvous point five miles south of Pulo Tenggol had been understood "in case of just such an occurrence." Cod returned there after each search along the beach. "Am now beginning to be apprehensive," the CO admitted, "and will try to calmly write down an 'estimate of the situation'."
At 1157 on August 3, Blenny's periscope spotted a large three-masted reddish-brown junk near Pulo Kapas. The log records: "Junk shows white patch on leech of mainsail in conformance with description given by COD... Breathed a fervent prayer that this was it and not just a fancied resemblance."
At 1226, closing at flank speed: "Can see junk is luffing up, can see people moving on deck, can see something white moving about (the white dog COD described). Boy oh boy are we happy." A minute later, they had communication with the boarding party, who were "anxious to make sure we know who they are."
By 1234, Blenny was alongside. The party came aboard: Lt.(jg) Franklin S. Kimball (an old shipmate of Blenny's CO) in charge, plus Babick, McKnight, Tolle, Kinfroe, and See Tone, the Chinese interpreter. "All men were in perfect shape and considerably more composed than most of our crew, who were outwardly exceedingly jubilant."
The log adds a touching detail: Blenny was so happy at finding the survivors that instead of sinking the junk, they "gave junk crew canned goods and fresh bread... in accordance with sentiments of boarding party." After 48 hours adrift, all hands returned in good health.
Cod was originally supposed to rendezvous with USS Cobia to receive Lt. Drake and ammunition. But as Blenny's patrol report reveals, Cod was completely preoccupied with searching for her lost boarding party. At 0010 on August 2, Blenny's CO—coordinating the search—"told BOARFISH, who was much closer, to... rendezvous with COBIA at a certain position at 0430 to receive Lieutenant Drake for COBIA and 40mm and 5" ammunition for me. BOARFISH, COBIA and COD receipted for message." The search for lost shipmates took priority over everything else.
Boarfish's patrol report provides vivid details of the transfer. At 0340, Boarfish made contact with Blenny and Cod. The initial plan was to transfer Lt. Drake and ammunition via breeches buoy—a canvas seat resembling a pair of short trousers attached to a life ring, suspended from a pulley riding on a line stretched between ships. It allowed transfers without coming alongside, useful in rough seas or when maintaining distance was preferable. But the equipment wasn't cooperating: "constant binding of the block was slowing down operations." Boarfish asked Cod to simply come alongside instead. By 0555, the transfer was complete: Lt. Drake and 48 rounds of 40mm ammunition. Cod got underway at 0601.
But Boarfish wasn't done—Blenny had also requested 5" ammunition for herself. At 0622, Boarfish began rigging a breeches buoy to Blenny. At 0815, while ammunition was still passing between the two submarines, an unidentified aircraft appeared at 15 miles. They kept working. The plane headed north—"agonizingly slowly he passed out of sight." Boarfish's log captures the tension: "The man in the shears, standing by to butcher knife the hawser, was fairly crying to perform." That sailor was ready to cut the line at a moment's notice if they needed to dive—but desperate not to abandon the transfer. At 0850, the ammunition was finally across.
This cryptic entry connects to a covert operation conducted by USS Cobia. On July 27, 1945, Cobia landed a party on the west coast of Java consisting of four Javanese Muslim commandos and their handler—Australian intelligence officer Lieutenant (SP) Francis Bernard Kington Drake, R.A.N.V.R. Remarkably, his name was genuine rather than a cover identity—he happened to share a name with the famous Elizabethan naval raider.
Drake was a member of Secret Intelligence Australia (SIA)—Section "B" of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, a British unit that reported directly to MI6 in London. SIA worked closely with Netherlands Forces Intelligence and specialized in covert operations in the Dutch East Indies. Drake was later recommended for the Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE).
The commandos remained ashore to conduct operations behind Japanese lines; their fate is unknown.
Before the junk operations, Cod participated in a frustrating chase of a convoy that seemed supernaturally lucky. After three submarines fired torpedoes at the convoy without success, Cod's radar failed at the worst possible moment. The CO wrote with dark humor:
The bulk of Patrol 7's combat action consisted of 12 successive days of gun attacks on enemy cargo-carrying junks and motor sampans in the Gulf of Siam, near Pulo Tenggol off the coast of Malaya. Cod sank 23 junks and motor sampans plus one oil barge, totaling 2,200 tons of enemy cargo including rice, sugar, oil, crude rubber, and army supplies. Boarding parties inspected each vessel, confiscated papers, and ensured native crews could safely abandon ship before opening fire.
On July 26, Cod took aboard a volunteer Chinese crew member named Thomas See, who spoke English and lived in Singapore. He proved invaluable as an interpreter during subsequent boardings, supplementing the Gunnery Officer's "dictionary-acquired linguistic ability."
In a coordinated attack with USS Blenny, Cod approached an anchored fleet of 12 vessels at dawn near Pulo Kapas. After firing .50 caliber bursts to wake native crews and allow them to abandon ship, both submarines opened fire with 5-inch and 40mm guns—7 vessels confirmed sunk between them. Throughout this period, Cod was bombed twice while diving after sinking junks, with bombs landing progressively closer each time.
Enroute to Fremantle on August 7, Cod sighted a periscope at 1927 and exchanged recognition signals with USS Chub (SS-329). Chub needed ammunition. By 2100, Cod had rigged a breeches buoy for transfer—"strictly a ship's force job"—heading into a force 3 sea on a steady course while Chub kept station 40-60 yards abeam. By 2232, they had passed across 35 rounds of 5-inch, 48 rounds of 40mm, movies, and mail. "Our jury-rig has worked fine." At 2235, Cod bid Chub goodbye and set course for Lombok Strait.
Cod arrived at Fremantle on August 13, 1945, ending her seventh and final war patrol.
She would go on to serve in the peacetime Navy until 1954, later becoming a reserve training vessel. Today, USS Cod is preserved as a National Historic Landmark in Cleveland, Ohio—one of the best-preserved WWII fleet submarines in existence.
| Patrol | Duration | Days in Area | Ships Sunk | Personnel Lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st | 63 days | 47 | 1 (~5,000 tons) | 0 |
| 2nd | 62 days | 45 | 2 (~9,800 tons) | 0 |
| 3rd | 56 days | 43 | 1 DD + 3 AK (~21,500 tons) | 0 |
| 4th | 53 days | 38 | 4 (~8,500 tons) | 0 |
| 5th | 63 days | 45 | 3 (~15,000 tons) | 0 |
| 6th | 51 days | 38 | 1 (minesweeper) | 1 (KIA) |
| 7th | 49 days | 35 | 24 (junks, by gunfire) | 0 |
Tonnage figures are approximate, based on patrol report assessments. Official JANAC credit: ~27,000 tons.
These seven patrols established USS Cod's combat record during the most intensive period of the Pacific submarine campaign. From a green boat on her first patrol to a battle-tested veteran, Cod and her crew learned hard lessons about torpedo reliability, convoy tactics, and the art of submarine warfare in contested waters.